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The seminal work of Maynard Prince and Price in 1973 [3] laid the foundations
in establishing the concepts of evolutionarily stable game strategies. It attempts
to select strategies which are robust to evolutionary selection pressures. How-
ever we observe that most of the literature has evolved is concentrated on single
objective games. In this work we extend the notion of evolutionary stabilty to
games with vector payoff functions. We trust that this notion of Multicrite-
ria evolutionary stability, models a much larger class of interactions in social,
economic and biological problems.
As with single objective games, we focus on symmetric pairwise interactions
within a single large population. It does not involve interactions between more
than two individuals at a time. We observe that there are many ways of defining
the score function which yield different notions of robustness.
1.1 Notations
The analysis concerns symmetric two player games. However these games are
different in the sense that the payoff function for each player is vector valued.
Since the games are symmetric we can denote both the players pure strategy
set as K = {1, 2, · · · , k} and the associated mixed strategy set as ∆ = {x ∈
Rk+ :
∑
i∈K xi = 1}. In this work, we introduce the notion of Multiple Matrix
Games (MMG) which is a natural extension to the Bi-Matrix Games in the
single objective setting. The same matrix notation has also been considered
by [2]. Associated with each player is a sequence of matrix payoff functions
(A1, A2, · · · , Al) and (B1 = AT1 , B2 = AT2 , · · · , Bl = ATl ) (for player I and
II respectively). We assume that player I is the row-player and player II is
column player. The polyhedron of mixed strategy profiles is then Θ = ∆2, and
the vector payoff to strategy x ∈ ∆, when played against y ∈ ∆, is given by
u(x, y) = (u1, u2, · · · , ul)(x, y) = (x.A1y, x.A2y, · · · , x.Aly). The Pareto best
response replies to any strategy y ∈ ∆ is denoted by βP∗(y) ⊂ ∆. The set of
all symmetric Pash Nash equilibria is denoted by ∆PNE
1.2 Evolutionary Stability
Assume there exists a large population which plays the same incumbent strategy
x ∈ ∆. Let us suppose small group of mutants which are programmed to play
some mutant strategy y ∈ ∆ are introduced into the original population. Let the
share of mutants in the post-entry population be ε ∈ (0, 1). Pairs of individuals
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Notation Definition Name
x y xi > yi i = 1, 2, .., l Strict component-wise order
x > y xi ≥ yi i = 1, 2, .., l and x 6= y Component-wise order
x >lex y xj > yj j = min{i : xi 6= yi} j ≤ l Lexicographic component-wise order
xλ > yλ λ
Tx > λT y λ ≥ 0 λ-scalarized order
Table 1: Table of Orders in Rl
are drawn from this hybrid population to play a game. For any individual the
probability that the opponent will play the mutant population yis ε and the
probability that the opponent will play the incumbent strategy x is 1− ε. Thus
the post-entry payoff to the incumbent strategy is u(x, εy + (1− ε)x) and that
of the mutant strategy is u(y, εy + (1− ε)x).
Definition A strategy x ∈ ∆ is said to be evolutionary stable in the  ordering
if ∀y ∈ ∆, y 6= x, ∃ some εy such that ∀ε ∈ (0, εy)
u(x, εy + (1− ε)x)  u(y, εy + (1− ε)x)
The various orderings  on Rl that we consider are shown in table 1. We
find that various orderings gives i rise to several definitions for evolutionary
stability in the multi-objective setting.
1.3 Strong Ideal Evolutionary Stability
When order  is chosen to be the strict component-wise order we obtain the
strong ideal evolutionary stability. Let us denote all the strongly ideal evolution-
ary stable strategies by ∆SIESS . To characterize this evolutionary robustness
let us consider the sequence of auxillary games which arise from the components
of the vector payoff function.
The sequence of symmetric component games is given by the payoff matrices
Am, Bm = ATm 1 ≤ m ≤ l which correspond to the matrices in the original
multiple objective game. We denote each game as Gcm, 1 ≤ m ≤ l and the
corresponding best replies for each of these games by βm∗(y) 1 ≤ m ≤ l. Let us
denote the symmetric nash equilibria for each of these games by ∆NE(G
c
m). The
evolutionarily stable equilibria for each of these games is denoted by ∆ESS(G
c
m).
Proposition 1.1 ∆SIESS = ∩m∆ESS(G
c
m)
Proof If x ∈ ∆SIESS
⇒ u(x, εy + (1− ε)x) u(y, εy + (1− ε)x)
⇒ u(x, εy + (1− ε)x) u(y, εy + (1− ε)x)
⇒ um(x, εy + (1− ε)x) > um(y, εy + (1− ε)x) 1 ≤ m ≤ l
⇒ x ∈ ∆ESS(Gcm) 1 ≤ m ≤ l
1.4 Ideal Evolutionary Stability
With component-wise order we obtain ideal evolutionary stability. Let us de-
note all the ideal evolutionary stable strategies by ∆IESS . Let us consider the
component games introduced in subsection 1.3.
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Proposition 1.2
∆IESS = {x ∈ ∩m∆NE(G
c
m) | u(y, y) < u(x, y) ∀y ∈ ∩mβ∗m(x), y 6= x}
Proof Let us define the score function for the strategy x ∈ ∆ f(ε, y) = u(x, εy+
(1− ε)x)− u(y, εy + (1− ε)x). If x ∈ ∆ is ideally evolutionary stable then
f(ε, y) > 0
⇒ u(x, εy + (1− ε)x)− u(y, εy + (1− ε)x) > 0
⇒ u(x− y, x) + εu(x− y, y − x) > 0
⇒ u(x− y, x) ≥ 0 and if u(x− y, x) = 0, then u(y, y) < u(x, y)
⇒ x ∈ ∩m∆NE(G
c
m) and if y is alternate best reply
for all the component games then u(y, y) < u(x, y)
1.5 Lexicographic Evolutionary Stability
With lexicographic order we obtain ideal evolutionary stability. Let us denote all
the lexicographic evolutionary stable strategies by ∆LESS . We again consider
the component games introduced in subsection 1.3.
Proposition 1.3
∆LESS = {x ∈ ∩jm=1∆NE(G
c
m) | u1(y, y) ≤ u1(x, y), u2(y, y) ≤ u2(x, y), · · · , uj−1(y, y) ≤
uj−1(x, y), uj(y, y) < uj(x, y) ∀y ∈ ∩jm=1β∗m(x), y 6= x}
Proof The proof is again based on the vector score function,
f(ε, y) = u(x− y, x) + εu(x− y, y − x) >lex 0
⇒
f1(ε, y) = 0
f2(ε, y) = 0
...
f j−1(ε, y) = 0





∀y ∈ ∩jm=1β∗m(x), y 6= x
u1(y, y) ≤ u1(x, y),
u2(y, y) ≤ u2(x, y),
...,
uj−1(y, y) ≤ uj−1(x, y),
uj(y, y) < uj(x, y)
1.6 Biased Evolutionary Stability
The λ-scalarized order gives rise what we call as the Biased Evolutionary Sta-
bility. Let us denote these strategies by ∆BESS .
This ordering is typically used to compare vectors wherein one component
has relatively higher importance in the ordering when compared to the others.
This gives rise to the perceived bias in the payoff functions of the game. To
characterize the biased evolutionary stable strategies, we consider an auxiliary
symmetric single objective game G(λ). The payoff function for strategy x ∈
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∆ against y ∈ ∆ in game G(λ) is given by λTu(x, y) (where u(x, y) is the
corresponding vector payoff in the multi-objective game).
Proposition 1.4
∆BESS = {x ∈ ∆PNE | y 6= x, y ∈ β∗P (x)⇒ x dominates y
as a reply to opponent strategy y}
Proof The proof is based on the score function of the auxiliary game.
f(ε, y) = λTu(x− y, x) + ελTu(x− y, y − x) > 0
⇒ λTu(x− y, x) ≥ 0
⇒ λTu(x, x) ≥ λTu(y, x)
⇒ x ∈ ∆PNE
if y ∈ β∗P (x)⇒ λTu(x− y, y − x) > 0
⇒ λTu(x, y)− λTu(y, y) < 0
⇒ x dominates y as a reply to strategy y
Remark The λ-scalarized ordering yields a form of evolutionary stability that
closely resembles single objective evolutionary stable strategy set.
2 Achieving Pareto ESS - Scalarized Replicator
Dynamics
Replicator dynamics have been studied extensively in the single objective set-
tings and their relations to evolutionary stability has been well established
(Chapter 3 of [1]). In this section we extend from first principles the population
dynamics in a multi-objective setting and establish a new form of replicator dy-
namics. We also attempt to provided some insights into the dynamic stability
of the multi-criteria replicator dynamics.
2.1 Population Dynamics under biased fitness function
Consider a large but finite population of individuals who are programmed to
pure strategies i ∈ K in a symmetric multi-objective two player game with
the vector payoff function u. Let pi(t) ≥ 0 t ≥ 0 denote the number of of
individuals who are currently programmed to the pure strategy i ∈ K, and
p(t) =
∑
i∈K pi(t) ≥ 0. The population state is given by the population share
vector x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), · · · , xk(t)), where each component xi(t) = pi(t)/p(t).
Thus x(t) ∈ ∆. The expected vector payoff to any pure strategy i at a random
match, when the population is in state x ∈ ∆, is accordingly u(ei, x). The





It is common in evolutionary biology to describe the population dynamics
using a fitness function. The fitness function usually describes the number of
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offspring per unit time. The fitness usually reflects the payoffs. A particular
population changes its population share based on its fitness in the current pop-
ulation state. For this work, we assume that the fitness is governed by a biased
payoff function. We assume that each of the component payoffs has a scale of
relative importance in governing the population growth or death. Let suppose
the payoff enters the fitness in the form λTu. Let us also suppose there is a
background birth and death rate β ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0. This results in the following
population dynamics.
ṗi = [β + λTu(ei, x)− δ]pi
The corresponding dynamics for the population shares xi becomes
ẋi = [λTu(ei, x)− λTu(x, x)]xi · · · (BRE(λ)) (1)
Since these dynamics are based on the fitness function obtained from the
biased payoff, we refer to BRE(λ) as the Biased Replicator Dynamics.
Remark It should be noted here that this form of dynamics corresponds to
interactions between two randomly chosen entities from a large population with
partitions which play a particular pure strategy i ∈ K. Further this dynamics
corresponds to a game where all the players choose the same trade-off weights
among the various objectives of their vector payoff functions.
Pareto Nash Equilibria
The set of Pareto Nash Equilibria is for the vector payoff symmetric two player
game is given by
∆PNE = {x ∈ ∆ | x = arg Pmax
z∈∆
u(z, x)} (2)
There is an alternative representation for the Pareto Nash Equilibria given
by the following lemma. Let U(z, x) denote the decision space for player I,
when player II chooses to play strategy x ∈ ∆. From the multicriteria linear
programming perspective we know that U is a convex polyhedron with vertices
in u(ei, x) i ∈ K.
Lemma 2.1
∆PNE = { x ∈ ∆| λTu(ei, x) = λTu(x, x)
i ∈ C(x) and u(ei, x) ∈ Pareto Dominating Face of U
where λ ∈ Rl>0 is the normal to the corresponding face.}
Proof Every face of the convex polyhedron is supported by a hyperplane and
thus there ∃λ ∈ Rl>0 such that λT (u(ei, x)−u(y, x)) = 0, for all y in a particular
face of convex polyhedron. If face of polyhedron contains x, then λT (u(ei, x)−
u(x, x)) = 0. Further x ∈ Pareto dominating face of the convex polyhedron
then x ∈ ∆PNE .
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Pareto Nash Equilibria with a given trade-off
In any symmetric game it is very much possible for both the player to choose
strategies which are asymmetric. However for the random interactions game
which we have considered, the set of symmetric strategies is sufficient to char-
acterize the dynamics. However for these symmetric games we observe that
symmetry also in the trade-off function.
Lemma 2.2 At x ∈ ∆PNE, a symmetric Pareto Nash equilibrium both the
players strategies are supported by the same exiting hyperplane.
Proof Suppose λ ∈ Rl>0 is the normal of the existing hyperplane ⇒ x =
argmaxzin∆PλTu(z, x). Suppose u2 is the payoff of player II, by the symmetric
of the payoffs we have u(z, x) = u2(x, z). Thus strategies of both the players
are supported by the same exiting hyperplane λ.
We observe that the game strategies are symmetric even in the sense of trade-
off. For a given trade-off vector λ, let us denote the set of trade-off equivalent
symmetric strategies are ∆PNE(λ).
∆PNE(λ) = x ∈ ∆| x = argmax
z∈∆
λTu(z, x)




Thus all the Pareto Nash symmetric equilibria can be characterized using aux-
iliary single objective games of the form above. This observation is helpful in
characterizing the stationary states of BRE.
Stationary States
The stationary states of the autonomous dynamics given by BRE(λ) is given
by
∆o(λ) = {x ∈ ∆|λTu(ei, x) = λTu(x, x) ∀i ∈ C(x)} (4)
Let ∆oo(λ) denote the set of interior stationary states of BRE(λ). i.e.
∆oo(λ) = ∆o(λ) ∩ int(∆)
We present a series of propositions to characterize the stationary and stable
set of the BRE. The proofs are based on the observation in Equation 3. They
are obtained trivially by considering the single objective symmetric game with
a scalar payoff λTu(x, y). Refer to chapter 3 of [1] for the detailed proof of the
single objective case.
Proposition 2.3 {e1, e2, · · · , ek} ∪∆PNE(λ) ⊂ ∆o(λ). ∆oo(λ) = ∆PNE(λ) ∩
int(∆).
Proposition 2.4 If x ∈ ∆ is Lyapunov stable in BRE(λ), then x ∈ ∆PNE(λ).
Let suppose that ζλ(t, x0) is a solution to BRE with ζλ(0, x0) = x0.
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Proposition 2.5 If x0 ∈ int(∆) and ζ(t, x0)→ x, then x ∈ ∆PNE(λ).
Both the aforementioned propositions are related to the fact that Lyapunov
stable states must be stationary states of the dynamics. We proceed to charac-
terise the asymptotically stable states of the dynamics. We begin by introducing
a candidate Lyapunov function. To define its domain, consider the neighbour-
hood set
Qx = {y ∈ ∆| C(x) ⊂ C(y)}








behaves as a Lyapunov function the biased replicator dynamics. The time
derivative along the dynamics is given by
˙Hx(y) = −λT [u(x, y)− u(y, y)]
Proposition 2.6 If x ∈ ∆BESS then BRE(λ) is asymptotically stable.
Proof The proof is based on Lyapunov’s direct method. Since x ∈ ∆BESS we
have ˙Hx(y) < 0 ∀y ∈ Nx ∪Qx, where Nx is some neighbourhood of x.
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